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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
D was under a duty to use his land in strip mining so as not to
damage P's land. His duty was to confine and restrain debris and
to place debris in such a position that it could not reasonably be
expected to be washed into a stream and on P's land. Oresta v.
Romano Bros., 137 W. Va. 683, 73 S.E.2d 622 (1952). D ceased
mining operations in 1950, withdrew from the state in 1951, and the
debris was not washed onto P's land until more than a year later,
in August, 1952. The fact that the cause of action was so long in
accruing must have influenced the court's decision. After all, West
Virginia is interested in getting more foreign businesses to locate
in the state, not drive them away because of the fear that some day in
the dim future after leaving the state, they will be held liable to
defend a suit in an area where they have severed connections.
P. B. H.
INSURANCE-AuTHORrrY OF AGENT TO WAIVE CONDITIONS OF
POLICY.-Action by widow who had been designated as beneficiary
in a life insurance policy. The policy application contained a
clause that if the premium was paid when application was made,
the policy would become effective and protect the applicant when
the company approved the application and that otherwise, no in-
surance would be in force under the application unless and until
a policy had been issued and delivered, and the full first premium
stipulated in the policy was actually paid to, and accepted by, the
company during the life time and insurability of the applicant.
However, the company increased the premium after the physical
examination and in a telephone conversation with the agent, the
applicant agreed to accept the policy with the increased premium
and the agent agreed to deliver the policy the next morning. How-
ever, the applicant died the following morning before the policy was
delivered. Held, affirming judgment for P, that there was a con-
structive unconditional delivery of the policy and that the agent
had authority to waive, and did waive, the premium. Gurley v.
Life 8c Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 182 F. Supp. 289 (M.D.N.C.
1955).
It is axiomatic that the provisions or conditions precedent of
an insurance policy must be either complied with or waived before
a binding contract of insurance is created. The principal case turns
on the performance of two such conditions, existing in a factual
situation worthy of a law professor's ingenuity. They are: first;
the prepayment of the first premium during the life of the insured
and, second; the delivery of the insurance policy, and are basic to
almost every life insurance policy.
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It is apparently well settled that delivery is not necessarily
confined to manual transmission of the policy and may be satisfied
by constructive delivery, the idea being that what actually controls
is the intent of the parties. Kinney v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 200
Wash. 190, 93 P.2d 360 (1939); Dawson v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co.
of Milwaukee, Wis., 192 N.C. 312, 135 S.E. 34 (1926); Hardy v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 154 N.C. 430, 70 S.E. 828 (1911). However,
when words "actually delivered" or "delivered and received" are
used in the policy, the courts seem unable to make up their minds.
See Powell v. North State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 153 N.G. 124, 69 S.E.
12 (1910); Furlington v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 193 N.C. 481,
137 S.E. 422 (1927).
There are three elements which have been held to be essential
to a valid legal delivery: (1) the person executing the policy must
intend to give it legal effect as a completed instrument; (2) mani-
festation of the insurer's intent to put the instrument beyond his
legal control by some word or act; and (3) the insured's acquiescence
in this intention. Kinney v. Northern Life Ins. Co., supra; New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 104 Ga. 67, 39 S.E. 273 (1898); Folb
v. Ins. Co., 109 N.C. 568 (1891); McCully's Adm'r v. Ins. Co., 18
W. Va. 782 (1881). Of these essential elements, only number three
would appear to be present in the principal case. In view of this,
despite the fact that it might be an ". . . extreme technicality ... "
in the principal case to hold that the telephone conversation did
not operate as a constructive delivery, it would appear that the court
is writing a new contract between the parties to hold that it did
operate as a constructive delivery.
Where an agent who had erroneously accepted $7.55 instead
of $8.00 as prepayment of the premium on a life insurance policy,
and insured agreed over the telephone to pay the additional
premium and sign an amended application the next morning, but
died that night, it was held that there was no acceptance or con-
structive delivery of the policy. Kinney v. Northern Life Ins. Co.,
supra. And in Rogers v. Great-West Life Assur. Co. 48 F.
Supp. 86, 88 (W.D. Minn. 1942), the court said, "It is to no
purpose to delve into what might have happened if Rogers had not
died but had picked up the policy as he had planned on the next
day. We are bound to consider, and are limited to, the status of
the contract and the arrangements between the parties which
existed prior to the death of the insured."
In the principal case, whether or not there was a delivery or
constructive delivery of the policy is not of itself controlling. The
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payment of the premium and the delivery of the policy are mutually
dependent on each other and there can be no binding contract of
insurance until both conditions are fulfilled. McKenzie v. North-
western Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 Ga. App. 225, 105 S.E. 720 (1921).
In view of the express conditions contained in the policy,
even admitting there was a constructive delivery, if, as the court
holds, the delivery is unconditional and acts as a waiver of the
payment of the first premium, the agent must have authority to
make such a delivery and waiver. Carter v. Cotton States Life Ins.
Co., 56 Ga. 237 (1876). Ordinarily, a soliciting agent cannot waive
terms or conditions expressly set forth in the policy. Southern
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Avery, 230 Ala. 685, 168 So. 236 (1935);
North Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 206 N.C.
460, 174 S.E. 298 (1934). And the court in the principal case so
agrees, at page 292. However, the court goes on to cite Hill v.
Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 200 N.C. 115, 122, 156 S.E. 518 (1931);
and Thomas v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 104 F.2d 480
(4th Cir. 1939), for the proposition that an agent's authority is de-
termined by the extent and nature of the business the principal
permits him to transact, and not solely by the limitations under his
employment or those contained in the policy. This abstract state-
ment, of course, is undisputed. But in the Hill and Thomas cases,
supra, as a matter of fact, the agents involved were general agents
in that their duties were broadly defined, were of a definite super-
visory and managerial capacity, and they were referred to as "general
agents", "superintendents", and "supervisors" by their companies.
Such is not the case here. The court would appear to be indulging
in summary conclusions, at page 293, where it says that the agent
"... was the company itself doing business through him its will to
place the policy as issued, having supplied him with the policy to
deliver...." The language in the letter to the agent declining to
accept the application, the express conditions in the application, the
same conditions in the policy, the company's refusal to negotiate
upon any other terms; all these factors would seem to show dearly
the company's insistence upon compliance with its provisions and
the narrow limitation of the agent's authority.
It is true, as stated by the court in the principal case, that the
absolute and unconditional delivery of an insurance policy is a
waiver of the stipulation for a previous or contemporaneous pay-
ment on the first premium. But again there is a question of author-
ity and the cases of Murphy v. Lafayette Mut. Life Ins Co., 167 N.C.
334, 83 S.E. 461 (1914); and Grier v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 182 N.C.
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542, 44 S.E. 2 8 (1903), cited by the court as its authority on this
point, were both cases where the deliveries and consequent waivers
were made by executive officers of the insurance companies involved.
The basic point submitted here is that insurance corporations
must necessarily transact their business through agents. VANCE,
INSURA E § 78 (3d ed. 1951). And since this is so, the courts must
scrutinize the facts meticulously before applying any rule of law
to a situation where such an agent is involved. Under all the
facts and circumstances, the decision in the principal case appears
to be wrong.
C. S. McG.
INSURANE-LIABILrTY OF INSURER FOR UNAUTHORIZED Acr OF
SOLICITING AGENT.-Deceased was accidentally killed after paying
first premium for life insurance contract with D. D's agent had
assured deceased of the immediate effectiveness of the policy. The
receipt for the premium payment included a statement that the poli-
cywould not be effective until a medical examination was completed.
Such examination did not take place prior to death. The beneficia-
ries appealed from a decision that no contract existed. Held, that the
issue of whether insurer was bound by unauthorized acts of agent
in stating that the policy became effective immediately, rather than
upon insured's passing a physical examination as indicated in the
application, was for the jury if the deceased in good faith relied
upon the statement of the agent. Gettins v. United States Life Ins.
Co., 221 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1955) (2-1 decision).
As was noted in Field v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 77 Utah
45, 290 Pac. 979 (1930), there is considerable confusion resulting
from decisions of the courts with regard to the powers of soliciting
agents of life insurers. It would seem that closer adherence to the
basic rules of agency law would result in a change in the decision of
the instant case as well as in many of those previously decided.
There is no question "that a contract of insurance can be made
by parol, unless prohibited by statute, or other positive regulation.
... That it is not usually made in this way is no evidence that it
cannot be so made." Relief Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Shaw, 94 U.S.
574, 577 (1896). This validity of oral contracts of insurance coupled
with the well known inclination of many courts to construe the con-
tract strongly in favor of the insured has led to decisions confirming
as a contract the unauthorized act of a soliciting agent. Modern
Woodmen of America v. Lawson, 110 Va. 81, 65 S.E. 509 (1909).
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